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Civilized societies cherish the belief that life is priceless, not to
be bartered for mere economic returns. If life has infinite value,
should we not prohibit even the voluntary acceptance of risks to
life?
It now seems clear that this ethic cannot survive in modern
society. Risks are inherent in many of the technologies that have
so dramatically improved the quality of twentieth-century life and,
in the process, extended longevity. To compound the problem, we
have developed the ability to detect risks at exceedingly low levels.
Many products of modern society once thought safe now would
flunk the no-risk test.
With this dissonance revealed, society is increasingly moving
to a standard of acceptable risk. This test is easily met if the risks
created by a product are outweighed by those reduced by it-that
is, if the product's net effect is to diminish risks to health. Often,
however, it may be difficult to trace such net effects. Moreover,




Even if the net risk standard could be promulgated and used
effectively, it would not be appropriate. A product or technology
may offer other, nonhealth benefits, such as cheaper power or
swifter transport, that must be traded off against health risks.
Such nonhealth benefits may have positive second-order conse-
quences for health, because the resource savings associated with
these benefits can be redeployed to promote health and longevity.2
Attempts to define acceptable risk encounter intractable scien-
tific problems. Even if they could be solved-if we could predict
the consequences of using any product or technology-we still
would have to ask how risk choices should be made. This question
is ultimately a philosophical issue, and one to which Samuel
Stumpf has contributed not only in his writings, but in testimony,
in committee deliberations, and in his work with industry, con-
sumer groups, and the government.
In the late 1970s, I had the privilege to serve with Sam
Stumpf on the Social and Economic Committee of the Food Safety
Council. The Committee's assignment was to help define the prin-
ciples that should underlie food safety regulation and to design an
appropriate, effective regulatory process.3
I. INTRODUCTION
Whereas the risks of nuclear power and lead emissions from
gasoline are imposed on the individual by others, food safety risks
are associated with voluntary behavior. The principal argument for
regulating any voluntarily assumed risk-whether it involves food
1. For example, the Delaney Amendment rules out any food additive shown to be car-
cinogenic in animals or human beings. This standard would prohibit even a highly beneficial
food preservative if it imposed an infinitesimal carcinogenic risk. Food Additives (Delaney)
Amendment of 1958, 21 U.S.C. § 348(c)(3)(A) (1982).
2. This view reflects the economic perspective that stresses the transmutability of re-
sources within the economy as a whole. This is not to suggest that a power plant can be
turned into a safer automobile, but that dollars measure the value of resources saved, and
the saved dollars can be used to buy alternative resources such as highway barriers or car
padding, or vaccinations against disease. Assuming that the processes of social choice are
roughly rational, if society chooses not to redeploy the saved resources to lifesaving, it is
better off than it would be otherwise. For example, assume that policy B could be trans-
formed into policy B', which offers less risk and more benefits than the status quo policy, A.
If society chooses B in preference to B', then B is preferred to the status quo, A.
3. The Food Safety Council was composed of industry, consumer, public, and aca-
demic representatives. For the Food Safety Council's final report, see FOOD SAFrY COUNCIL,
A PROPOSED FOOD SAFETY EVALUATION PROCESS: FINAL REPORT OF BOARD OF TRUSTEES (1982)
[hereinafter cited as 1982 FOOD SAFTY COUNCIL REPORT].
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safety or the use of automobile seat belts-is that it is difficult for
individual decision makers to obtain, process, and use information
on the consequences of their choices.
The objective of food safety regulation should be to promote
the consumption pattern that well-informed consumers would
choose for themselves. 4 That premise, widely though not uniformly
accepted, underlies this analysis.5
The process of making regulatory decisions comprises three
critical elements: predicting consequences, organizing information,
and choosing among alternative sets of attributes. Prediction con-
cerns such questions as: How much of a product will be consumed;
how much a particular use for a product will reduce costs; and
what level of risk is entailed by various levels of use. If all predic-
tive information was provided in undigested form, the regulatory
process would be overwhelmed. The information must be organized
so that rational choices can be made. This Article discusses the
assessment of risks and benefits as one approach to organizing
information.
The way information is organized should depend on the way it
will be valued and used. For example, the decision making authori-
ties within the regulatory process may choose to take different ap-
proaches to food substances consumed by young and old, or rich
and poor. In that case, information should be organized into those
categories. An exquisite breakdown of consumption patterns by
counties would do little for an age-regarding regulatory process.
The remainder of this Article is divided into four parts. Part
II reviews the general nature of risk and benefit assessment within
the context of its somewhat better-understood relatives, cost-bene-
fit analysis and cost-effectiveness analysis. Part III discusses a clas-
sification mechanism for the benefits of additives and contami-
nants in food and outlines the economic approach for converting
them to a common measure. Part IV discusses the measurement of
risk. Part V outlines a number of common errors that are made
when risk and benefit assessments are undertaken.
4. The countervailing danger is that regulation may overrule some individuals' prefer-
ences, preventing them from consuming products that they would select if fully informed.
5. Though this discussion is directed to food safety, the reader should be able to trans-
late it to such fields as product safety, building codes, air bags, or even areas in which health
risk is not concerned, including the entire field of consumer protection.
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II. COST-BENEFIT, RISK-BENEFIT, AND COST-EFFECTIVENESS
The concepts of cost-benefit, risk-benefit, and cost-effective-
ness analysis are valuable decision aids when used appropriately.
Because these terms often are used incorrectly, however, it is im-
portant to define each of them clearly. These methods all start
from one basic premise: When making decisions, particularly com-
plex and difficult decisions, it is desirable to consider all conse-
quences of possible action. Thus, the first step in each type of
analysis is to identify the consequences that will ensue. If the area
dealt with is one of uncertain outcomes, then an attempt should be
made to estimate the probability distribution of these different
outcomes.
A. Cost-Benefit
Cost-benefit analysis is the principal analytic framework used
in evaluating public expenditure decisions and is also useful in
guiding regulatory decisions. The objective of cost-benefit analysis
is to assure that resources are put to their most valuable use. Cost-
benefit analysis requires careful elaboration of all the benefits and
of all the costs that will accrue to all segments of society if a par-
ticular project is adopted. The basic principle is to tally the gains
from a project and then subtract the losses.6 If the difference is
positive, the project is sound from the standpoint of efficiency, and
it is recommended.
In cost-benefit analysis all consequences are converted to a
common metric. Most frequently the unit of measurement is dol-
lars, but other measures such as lives saved or units of food quality
could be used instead. When applied to the food safety area, cost-
benefit analysis runs into the excruciatingly delicate issue of valu-
ing lives. For example, what dollar price tag should be attached to
a life at a one percent elevated risk of cancer? 7
6. Losses include the direct costs of undertaking the project.
7. It is important to value the consequences on a probabilistic basis, for that is how
they are received by those confronting the risk. One who ingests a low-level carcinogen does
not necessarily contract cancer, but incurs a low-probability risk of getting cancer. The valu-
ation depends neither on the consequence alone nor on such frequently proposed aggregate
measures of the consequence, such as X number of cases in the nation per year. Rather, one
encounters a risk with both a severity and a probability.
This formulation strikes at the traditional distinction between statistical and identified
lives. For a variety of predominantly ethical reasons, our society abhors failure to sacrifice
huge amounts of resources to save identified lives. However, we are willing to accept sub-




Consider the application of cost-benefit analysis to the sim-
plest possible problem in the food safety area. Should we permit
additive A on the market or should we ban it? The first step in
answering this question is to detail all the costs and benefits that
accompany use of the additive. If the costs outweigh the benefits,
it should be banned, and vice versa.
A number of difficulties arise when we attempt to employ this
approach in food safety. First, rarely will we have the scientific
ability to make a full determination of the health costs of permit-
ting the use of an additive or other food substance. Second, even if
we could make exact assessments of the health risks, we still would
need a way of valuing those risks. With traditional cost-benefit
analysis, valuation is less problematic. In deciding whether to con-
struct a dam, for example, the question might be: How much are
100,000 gallons of irrigation water worth in terms of the capital
expenditures required to divert them? This question could be an-
swered by looking at market prices, or at economic and engineering
analyses to discover the value in use of the water, or by finding out
what people would be willing to pay for the water. Risks to life
present quite a different situation. They are never traded directly
on traditional markets, though they are sometimes one component
of other goods or commodities." No engineering or economic study
could tell us a life's value in use." Finally, asking individuals about
their valuation of life yields little guidance. Few individuals have
experienced purchasing the good, "reduced risk to life." An even
smaller number can distinguish what the probabilities associated
with such risks might mean.
Although the cost-benefit approach is clearly difficult to im-
plement, its spirit must be incorporated in any process of rational
Interest in the question of appropriate valuation of lives has increased substantially in
recent years. See, e.g., THE VALUE OF LIFE AND SAFETY (M. Jones-Lee ed. 1982); W. Viscusi,
The Valuation of Risks to Life and Health: Guidelines for Policy Analysis, in EVALUATION
OF THE STATE-OF-THE-ART IN BENEFITS ASSESsmENT METHODS FOR PUBLICPOLICY PURPOSES
(J. Bentkover, V. Covello, L. Lave, J. Menkes & J. Mumpower eds. 1985); Special Issue on
Risk Analysis, 30 MGMT. SCL 395, 395-528 (R. Sarin ed. 1984).
8. In deducing individuals' valuations for lives, a number of researchers have looked to
wage premiums paid for more hazardous employment. This is a highly imperfect method,
because it is hard to hold constant other aspects of the jobs. Moreover, not everyone is
bidding for the risky job. Some would demand a premium 10 times as great as the one
generated by the market.
9. Sometimes efforts are made to look at discounted earnings, or earnings less con-
sumption, but these measures hardly indicate the value an individual receives from increas-




decision making. The central tenet of cost-benefit analysis is that
the consumer should pay for something no more than what it is
worth. For example, if an additional unit of electricity is worth ten
dollars, it should be purchased if offered for nine dollars. If the
electricity is worth a new shirt and someone offers to trade a shirt
for the electricity, that trade should be made.10
Consider now the same problem with risks to life.1 How do
individuals decide what a lowered risk to life is worth? Individuals
and society continuously accept risks to life to save money or to
secure other benefits. As we drive faster on the highway, we save
travel time at the expense of greater accident risk. We eat rich des-
serts though they may increase somewhat our chances of having
heart attacks. We build buildings to resist earthquakes that are ex-
pected to occur once in 100 years but not those that are expected
to occur once in 10,000 years. In each case, we decide that the ex-
tra cost of further protection is not worth the sacrifice required.
On what basis should these decisions be made? The risk-benefit
approach provides guidance for dealing with this class of issues.
B. Risk-Benefit
Risk-benefit analysis starts from the same presumption "as
cost-benefit analysis: all consequences of an action should be iden-
tified and evaluated. However, risk-benefit analysis stops short of
fully aggregating the consequences. If the action under considera-
tion makes a resource expenditure to reduce a health risk, the
traditional categories for aggregation are health risks and economic
benefits. These categories compete against one another in such de-
cisions as those concerning highway safety or occupational safety
and health.
Food safety decisions are frequently more complex than many
familiar risk-benefit situations. For example, the decision to permit
nitrites in bacon may both promote health and entail some risks.
Samuel Stumpf contributed to this debate in his article Social As-
10. Let us first see the implication of this principle for efficient production of benefits.
Suppose there are two different ways to produce a unit of electricity. One costs $12, the
other $10. Currently 100 units are being produced with each method. The total cost is
$2200. Obviously, money could be saved if more were produced with the second technology
and less with the first. Indeed, if we produced 210 units with the second technology, the
total cost would be reduced and the total amount of electricity would be increased. This
would be an unquestioned gain.




pects of Risk/Benefit Analysis of the Food Supply.12 He concludes
by arguing for "the legitimacy and even necessity under certain
circumstances, where fundamental human values are concerned, to
engage in a reasoned risk/benefit calculation." As examples, Pro-
fessor Stumpf cites the banning of DDT in Ceylon, which led to
deaths due to malaria, and the removal of saccharin from the food
supply, which imposes the risks associated with sugar." The pre-
sent analysis goes further, arguing that nonhealth benefits may
trade off against health risks.1
4
Costs may appear on both sides of the equation as well. If re-
moval of an additive eliminates some convenience food, the price
may well be lowered, but the time cost for the food may increase.
Various possibilities suggest themselves for aggregating. All health
benefits and costs' 5 could be lumped together in one category, with
all other benefits and costs in another. This would provide the
traditional risk-benefit formulation. Alternatively, we could have
four separate categories: health costs, health benefits, nonhealth
costs, and nonhealth benefits. To simplify the following discussion,
we shall deal with the two-category formulation in which all health
consequences are lumped together as are all nonhealth
consequences.
The first objective of risk-benefit analysis is to provide accu-
rate and usable estimates of all the consequences of a regulatory
decision. Thus, risk-benefit analysis should help to promote the
generation of information. Suppose the decision under considera-
tion is a simple one: should food additive X be allowed on the mar-
ket or should it be banned from use? Applying the risk-benefit
analysis, the first step is to ask what gains consumers and produc-
ers would reap if the additive were permitted. The risks they
would incur then would be detailed. The result of this calculation
would be the computation of a single point in a graph plotting
risks against benefits.
If a risk-benefit analysis is pursued, the final decision on how
to value the risk or trade it off against benefits is not explicitly
resolved. This need not lead to inaction. First, it may be possible
to eliminate certain alternatives if the analysis shows that they are
inferior to another option in terms of both risk and benefit. Sec-
12. 32 FooD TECH., Aug. 1978, at 68-69.
13. Id.
14. Perhaps this difference reflects the perspective of an economist as opposed to a
philosopher/law professor.
15. We have employed the term costs here, rather than risks, to achieve parallelism.
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ond, by starting with the alternatives that offer the highest net
benefit relative to risk incurred and working down among the al-
ternatives, we can be sure that the set of risks accepted offers the
highest level of net benefits. This approach also assures that we are
not accepting a higher risk in one area in return for a particular
level of net benefits than we are in another area. This analysis is
made clearer by the use of a diagram.








In some decision contexts, matters will be simple. If the
choice, for example, were between points B and A in Figure 1, we
would have no difficulty selecting A. It offers the same level of ben-
efits at a lower level of risk. Similarly, point C would be preferred
over A. We would have difficulty, however, choosing between
points D and B. We would have to determine what level of risk to
accept to secure the additional benefits that D offers over B.'6 The
decision between point B and point D is of the same qualitative
nature as the choice between point X and the origin, in effect, the
choice between permitting and banning additive X. One alterna-
tive offers higher risk (a bad attribute) and higher benefits (a good
attribute) than the other. A comparison must entail a weighing of
16. It is important to recognize that point B is not to be preferred simply because it
offers a higher ratio of benefits to risks, a commonly heard but fallacious argument. Choices
based on ratios are only appropriate if projects can be extended in scale, if, for example, B
could be doubled to B*, a point that dominates D.
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the two. Consumers typically engage in a weighing of this sort
when they have to choose among alternative goods. For example,
one automobile may offer greater fuel economy but less comfort
than its competitor. The basic decision will depend on whether the
sacrifice in comfort is worth the gain in fuel economy.17
Microeconomics offers some further principles for rational
choice. The central principle relates efficiency to rates of tradeoff.
Efficiency requires that the marginal tradeoff between risk and net
benefits be the same across all decisions. This is an important find-
ing for food safety. Even if a prescribed use for a food additive is
determined to be worth the risk entailed, its use may be modified
so that the benefits sacrificed for a reduction in risk (or the bene-
fits gained by accepting a higher risk) more closely accord with the
preferences of society or the prescriptions of the regulatory pro-
cess. Consider a situation with two food additives, A and B. The
proposed uses convey the risks and benefits depicted in Figure 2.
Figure 2
Proposed Use Alternative Use
Risks to Net Benefits Risks to Net Benefits
Health Other than Health Health Other than Health
Additive A .0001 $1,000 .00005 $ 950
Additive B .0002 $ 800 .00025 $1,000
For the proposed use, Additive A is obviously more attractive
than B. It offers higher net benefits and less risk. This might incor-
rectly suggest that we should increase the use of A and reduce the
use of B. This conclusion, however, is inaccurate, as Figure 2 illus-
trates. The critical question is the ability to trade off at the margin
between risk and net benefits. Restricting the use of A entails rela-
17. A detour into symbols may aid exposition. Label the two attributes as x and y and
the alternatives as 1 and 2. Alternative 1 possesses the characteristics x,, Y,. The choice
criterion is whether x,, y, is preferred to x, , y.. One way of determining which is preferred is
to attach a score to each possible combination of x and y that indicates the combination's
degree of desirability. If the scoring system accurately reflects consumer preferences, the
alternative with the higher score should be chosen. This is the most basic principle of the
microeconomics of rational individual choice.
Traditional microeconomic choice problems frequently present the commodities them-
selves as objects of choice. That may be appropriate when we understand what the items
are, such as apples or pears. However, when they are complicated products such as cars or
food additives, it helps to break them down into components such as miles per gallon or
level of risk.




tively little reduction in benefits ($50) for a .00005 reduction in
risk, (.00005/50), while Additive B can offer $200 in additional ben-
efits for a .00005 increase in risk (.00005/200). Because the first
quotient is substantially greater than the second, we should ex-
pand the use of B and reduce that of A. At an efficient point the
two quotients, the rates of tradeoff between risks and benefits,
would be the same."
C. Cost-Effectiveness
Cost-effectiveness analysis is the general form of which risk-
benefit analysis is a special case. Cost-effectiveness analysis aggre-
gates consequences into two categories, but makes no attempt to
trade off or compare the two. That process is left to the ultimate
decision maker."' The underlying principle is that, although it is
possible for an analyst to aggregate within categories, it should not
be the analyst or scientific expert who feeds in the delicate value
judgments that determine just what balance of cost and effective-
ness should be achieved.
Applying the cost-effectiveness approach to the food safety
area, the two logical categories are the benefits of having the sub-
stance in the particular products in the food supply (foregone ben-
efits being cost) and the risk entailed (reduction in risk being
effectiveness).
There is no generally accepted procedure for aggregating risks
and benefits. Thus, even when it becomes essential to undertake
such aggregation, estimates of risk and benefit should be presented
separately in the analysis. This enables each analyst, critic, and
interested party to make judgments and determinations of his own.
The political, regulatory, and judicial institutions can respond to
this increase in usable information.
III. CLASSIFYING AND EvALUATING BENEFITS
A. Classifying Benefits
Food substances provide a variety of benefits. Together, they
sustain life. Individually, they may enhance health and make life
18. It is possible that the optimum would not involve use of one of the addi-
tives-what is often referred to as a corner solution. Even if margins are equated, this will
only assure efficiency if the ratio for totals is appropriate. There need be no concern over
totals if each alternative offers ever increasing ratios of risk/benefits as its use is expanded.
19. For example, military problems frequently are studied with the aid of cost-effec-
tiveness analysis, the two categories being military capability and dollar costs.
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more pleasurable in a variety of ways. Most food substances have
received general approval for unlimited use in the food supply.
Under the present system of food safety regulation, additives and
contaminants supposedly are judged for their safety, though the
benefits they provide are considered implicitly within the regula-
tory process.
In 1956 a National Academy of Sciences research council re-
port 20 listed over 550 substances intentionally added to food, ap-
proximately 300 of which were flavoring agents. The number now
surely is far larger. These additives fall into a number of catego-
ries,21 and they are found throughout the food supply-in cereal
products, processed fruits and vegetables, beverages, dairy prod-
ucts, candy, meat products, and fats. In addition to these deliber-
ately added substances, the food supply also contains contaminat-
ing substances that occur-either naturally or inadvertently-in
many products.22 These additives and contaminants are placed or
allowed to remain in the food supply for a reason. They are
designed either to make food products more appealing to consum-
ers, to lower the costs of producing the products, or to provide nu-
tritive or health benefits. We have classified such benefits under
four headings: appeal, convenience, resource saving and availabil-
ity, and health. We shall discuss them in this order, which is the
reverse of their likely order of overall importance in influencing
food safety decisions. Health is likely to prove most important,
convenience and appeal least important.23
1. Appeal
Appeal relates to the way the consumer reacts to a food prod-
uct. It includes flavor, appearance, texture, aroma, and taste. Fla-
20. FOOD PROTECTION COMMISSION OF THE FOOD AND NUTRITION BOARD, NATIONAL
ACADEMY OF SCIENCES, THE USE OF CHEMICAL ADDITIVES IN FOOD PROCESSING (1956).
21. They include preservatives, antioxidants, sequestrants, surfactants, emulsifiers,
stabilizers, thickeners, bleaching and maturing agents, buffers, acids, alkalies, food colors,
humectants, anticaking agents, foaming agents, foam inhibitors, solvents, flavoring agents,
nonnutritive sweeteners, and nutrient supplements.
22. The presence of aflatoxin in peanuts provides a salient example.
23. Economists are not willing to say one attribute, in general, is more important than
another. To make such a statement requires knowledge of how much of the various attrib-
utes already is being received. The magnitudes of observed differences are also relevant. For
example, someone who says that fuel economy is more important to him than comfort in
selecting a car is likely to be proved wrong if offered a choice between two cars that achieve
17.5 and 17.6 miles per gallon, with the 17.5 car offering twice as much leg room. What he
probably meant to say is that, with the distribution of cars one generally finds on the mar-
ket, gas mileage usually turns out to be the determining characteristic.
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voring agents are used to preserve or enhance the flavors of
processed foods. Flavoring agents may be either naturally occur-
ring spices and oils, such as cloves, ginger, pepper, and citrus oils,
or synthetic. Often, naturally occurring flavors do not survive
processing procedures as well as their synthetic counterparts.
Moreover, natural flavors are in short supply and often are availa-
ble only during certain times of the year. One can argue that artifi-
cial flavors increase food consumption because food lacking good
flavor might otherwise remain uneaten.
The extent to which manufactured flavors permeate our food
supply is staggering. Aromatic chemicals are used to impart such
flavors as pineapple, cherry, walnut, and wintergreen. The con-
sumption of synthesized strawberry flavor, converted to its
equivalent in fruit, approximates twice the U.S. production of
strawberries for all purposes. The consumption of synthesized
Concord grape flavor converted to its equivalent in fruit approxi-
mates five times the U.S. production of Concord grapes for all
purposes.1
4
Synthetic food colors are used to improve appearance. At least
thirty-seven different color additives were in use in 1977.25 Syn-
thetic agents are used in the coloring of cured meats,26 soft drinks,
candy, puddings, and dairy and bakery products. Antioxidants are
used to prevent or delay "enzymatic browning," the darkening of
certain fruits and vegetables when exposed to air after being cut,
bruised, or allowed to overmature. Consumers now exhibit a strong
desire for various colors in food. The extent to which this desire is
natural as opposed to artificially created is questionable, however,
as is the firmness with which consumers would adhere to these
desires in the face of added health risks.
Food additives are also used to create and maintain various
textures in foods. For example, emulsifiers are used to smooth the
texture of ice cream, while stabilizers are used both to smooth ice
cream and to increase its viscosity. Substances used to control pH
help create the textures of cheese spreads and processed cheese,
and they also control the texture of candy.
Two controversial issues related to the concept of appeal are
24. See MFG. CHEMISTS' ASS'N, FOOD ADDITIVES: WHAT THEY ARE/How THEY ARE UsED
21 (1976) (hereinafter cited as MFG. CHEMISTS' ASS'N REPORT].
25. See Harkins, Food Additive Safety Evaluation, 32 FoOD DRUG Cosh. L.J. 182, 187
(1977).




created tastes and authenticity. Some critics assert that consumers
do not have a basic preference for some of the attributes that they
choose to purchase in the food supply. These critics maintain that
such preferences are created both through advertising and through
continual exposure to products that have the disputed attributes.
According to this theory, after a limited period of exposure to col-
orless gelatin desserts, a wide segment of the population might dis-
cover that it no longer had a preference for colored gelatins. To the
extent that this theory is true, it would affect the calculation of the
benefits deriving from artificial coloring agents. Conceptually, how-
ever, the means for computing such benefits would not change.
Some of the additives placed in products to increase their aes-
thetic appeal are used to replace more expensive or less readily
processed natural agents. This substitution raises a critical issue
that has been discussed widely in other contexts, principally envi-
ronmental preservation. To what extent does it matter that a con-
sumer's perception of what he is consuming diverges from what he
actually is consuming? If a consumer cannot distinguish between a
product made with natural strawberries and one made with syn-
thetic strawberry flavoring and coloring, should we assign any
lower level of benefits to the second product? Here again, we would
recommend that consumers' preferences serve as the final arbiter.
Holding cost, convenience, and health effects fixed, if the consumer
does not prefer natural to synthetic agents, we should assign no
difference between them on the appeal dimension. On the other
hand, if some margin of preference persists, despite consumers' in-
ability to differentiate between the two without outside informa-
tion, that preference should be respected. If consumers are willing
to pay for authenticity, they should be allowed to do so.
2. Convenience
The convenience benefits of food additives come in many
forms. Food substances containing additives may be easier to
purchase, to store, and to process for final consumption. Antioxi-
dants and other preservative agents allow many foods to be stored
easily, resulting in the availability of a wider range of products and
also requiring less frequent trips to the store. In recent years, a
wide variety of products have become available that allow easier
food preparation. These products sometimes make preparation
swifter or less subject to human error and sometimes add fewer




3. Resource Savings and Availability
The major justification for the presence of some level of con-
taminants in food is the exceedingly high cost of removing them
completely. The cost of removal would raise the cost of food and,
in many instances, reduce its abundance. The critical question,
then, is what level of contamination should be permissible; the
lower the level, the greater the cost. In general, we should expect
that further reductions of the same increment will cost more and
more to make.27 Even assuming that the health benefits from re-
ducing contaminants are linear, because the costs of reducing con-
taminants are nonlinear, the optimal level for contaminants may
be positive, though less than the natural level.
28
In contrast to contaminants, additives are put into, rather
than taken out of the food supply. Additives have cost implications
in a number of ways. They can assist with the production of the
food itself.2 9 In addition, an additive may be employed at some
stage in the industrial preparation of a food to reduce its cost. Ad-
ditives as cost-reducing agents receive the most attention in their
roles as preservatives. The longer a product keeps in the store or in
the home, the less expensive it will be. Finally, additives can re-
duce costs by replacing a more expensive natural product. Re-
sources will be saved if a cheaper, synthetic flavor is used instead
of a natural flavor. Although additive-related products will not be
identical to natural products, they will save resources to the extent
that they compete with or are substituted for more expensive
products.
27. For example, it would cost more to reduce the aflatoxin level in peanuts from 15 to
10 parts per million than it would cost to reduce the level from 20 to 15 parts per million. It
is not clear that this will always be the case. Are there increasing marginal costs to reduced
percentages of fertilizer contamination? The answer would be no if the productivity of fer-
tilizers is fair, but the contamination as a function of level of application increases at a
decreasing rate.
In many instances contamination is a probabilistic phenomenon. A standard might set a
probability that some fixed level of contamination was exceeded. Here we would expect that
the cost of going from a two percent chance of exceeding the level down to a one percent
chance would be less than the cost of going from one percent to zero.
28. Most standards impose a level that cannot be exceeded. More sophisticated stan-
dards may set a level that can be exceeded only with a certain probability. An ideal stan-
dard would define some expected performance measure that would have to be met. Each
level would be assigned a score and the probability of exceeding that level would be multi-
plied times that score to give expected performance. This method is not a recommendation
for practice, but rather a theoretical point that should be considered when designing any
standards scheme.
29. For example, DES serves as a growth enhancer for cattle.
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We have assumed that the perspective for decision should be
that of an individual consumer. How can we be assured that reduc-
tions in cost achieved through the inclusion of additives and con-
taminants will be passed along to consumers? The answer depends
on the nature of the market in which the product is produced and
on the elasticity of demand for the product. If the market is com-
petitive, the full cost savings will be passed along to consumers. At
the other extreme, if the market is monopolistic, the. extent of
price reduction to the consumer will vary directly with the elastic-
ity of demand. Thus, if a monopoly is using a cheaper, additive-
related product to increase sales and there is fairly elastic demand,
most of the benefit will be passed along to consumers.
4. Health
Additives intended to protect or improve the health of con-
sumers fall into three main categories. One class of additives pro-
tects against disease. Nitrites, for example, are used to inhibit the
growth of Clostridic botulinum, a bacterium capable of producing
a potent toxin that, if ingested, can produce a number of neurolog-
ical manifestations and a fatality rate of twenty to thirty-five per-
cent in this country.30 Synthetic antioxidants are added to prevent
rancidity, to inhibit the carcinogenic action of polycyclic hydrocar-
bon carcinogens,31 and to inhibit the formation of free radicals-an
action found to prolong life in lab animals.
3 2
A second class of additives is used to provide important vita-
mins and minerals. This practice decreases the incidence of beri-
beri and pellagra in the United States as well as other diseases re-
lated to dietary deficiencies. Vitamin A, vitamin D, thiamine,
riboflavin, folic acid, and iron are especially important in this re-
gard. Scientists have estimated that the total cost of providing the
Recommended Daily Allowance of ten vitamins plus the necessary
30. The use of nitrites is not riskless, however. Nitrites can react with secondary
amines to form nitrosamines, which have been demonstrated to be carcinogenic to lab ani-
mals at low dosages. Awareness of this risk has led to proposals for the use of substances
such as ascorbate and erythorbate, which not only decrease the amounts of nitrites needed
to inhibit the growth of C. botulinum, but also inhibit the formation of nitrosarnines in the
digestive tract. See B. DAviS, R. DULBECCO, H. EIS EN, H. GINSBERG, W. WOOD & M. MCCARTY,
MCROBIOLOGY 834 (2d ed. 1973).
31. "[Ihe recent decrease in incidence of stomach cancer in the United States has
been attributed, at least in part, to the addition of BHA and BHT (butylated hydroxy-
anisole and butylated hydroxytoluene) to foods." Jukes, Current Concepts in Nutrition:




minerals through additives would be less than one dollar per per-
son per year. 3 The third class consists of additives that are substi-
tuted for other potentially harmful ingredients. Examples in this
category include the use of saccharin instead of sugar and marga-
rine instead of butter.
B. Evaluating Benefits
1. Nonhealth Benefits
Economics suggests the appropriate procedure for evaluating
the benefits that food additives yield to consumers: assign the val-
ues that well-informed consumers themselves would assign. If the
matter is a straightforward reduction in cost, there is no problem.
Being able to have a pound of meat available for $1.50 rather than
$1.80 is clearly worth $.30. Conceptually, appeal and convenience
offer little more complication. If a product is more appealing, eas-
ier to prepare, or easier to use, consumers will pay something for
that benefit. This is obviously the reason that food companies con-
tinually are trying to create more appealing and more convenient
products.
Quantifying how much such attributes are worth is more diffi-
cult. We might try to value the time the consumer saves when he
prepares a product with less effort or energy. The difficulty with
this approach is that we cannot find another use of his time that
he finds equally valuable. Many individuals, for example, may en-
joy a leisurely process of preparing a meal. Therefore, to value the
time saving at their wage would be a gross overstatement.
Once again, the answer to the problem of quantifying is the
consumer's willingness to pay. How much will consumers pay in
the market for more attractive or more convenient products?
There are two major difficulties with this approach. First, the mar-
ket rarely gives unequivocal information. Products that differ in
convenience undoubtedly differ in other characteristics as well,
one of which may be marketing effort. Merely observing the differ-
ence in prices paid in the market, therefore, will not be a good way
to estimate the benefits of convenience or improved aesthetics.
33. See MFG. CHEMISTS' ASS'N REPORT, supra note 24.
34. A most salient characteristic on which the products might differ is in their safety.
Assume, for example, that the risk level (or perceived risk level) of the more convenient
product made a consumer just indifferent between it and its competitor. Therefore, he
would pay no more for the convenient product. Although he still might be valuing the con-
venience quite highly, the risk offsets the convenience.
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A second, more technical complication relates to the different
valuation of a product by different consumers. Suppose two prod-
ucts differ only in convenience. The more convenient sells for three
dollars; the other sells for two dollars.36 This cost difference tells us
only that the marginal consumer, who is otherwise indifferent be-
tween the two products values the convenience at one dollar. There
may be some people who would pay much more than one dollar
extra for the more convenient product, and others, who are not
now buying it, who would pay substantially less. The true value of
the convenience is the average value to all the individuals who
would choose to purchase the product. 6
2. Health Benefits
Evaluating the health benefits of having a substance in the
food supply is often the mirror image of evaluating health risks.
We have substantially less experience with the benefit side of the
equation, however. We do not know how many cases of botulism
the presence of nitrites in meat prevents, nor do we have experi-
ence providing answers to such questions. Nevertheless, we believe
that some estimates along these lines are essential to make rational
food safety decisions. In general, procedures used to evaluate
health risks are appropriate for assessing health benefits as well.37
There is one major difference, however. With risk, it is important
to identify and assess every category of consequences. The negative
aspects of a particular substance or use could swamp the positive
elements. With benefits, however, we need only a level sufficient to
outweigh the risks. Therefore, a decision to permit the use of a
substance that is based on an incomplete summing-up of benefits
is not inherently flawed. The following section develops a method-
ology for organizing information on health benefits based on health
risks. For each class of benefit we look both to its magnitude or
severity and to the likelihood that it will be received.
35. When there is strong cross-elasticity of demand, consumer surplus cannot be com-
puted merely as areas under demand curves. See W. NICHOLSON, supra note 17, for appro-
priate techniques.
36. Fortunately, we need not be in the uncomfortable situation in which one product
must be selected over another. Both can survive on the market simultaneously.
37. See, for example, the proposed evaluation system laid out in the 1982 FooD SAFETY
COUNCIL REPORT, supra note 3.
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IV. CLASSIFYING AND EVALUATING RISK
A. Quantifying Risk-Severity and Probability
The term risk is used imprecisely in most food safety discus-
sions. In part because of the discussion that has grown up around
the Delaney Clause,38 risk is sometimes treated inappropriately as
a yes-no variable. The primary question has become: Is there any
risk? The honest answer must always be yes, even if all tests up to
now have failed to reveal any risk. Tests may be inadequate; errors
are possible. We can never prove the absolute absence of risk in
the use of a substance or process in the food area or elsewhere. A
zero-risk standard often ultimately leads to situations in which we
either override our regulatory procedures, as with saccharin, or we
gently delude ourselves by treating a risk computed to be below a
particular magnitude as if it were zero.
Decisions, however, should be made on the basis of the best
possible estimates of risk. Decision processes will inevitably trade
off benefits against risks in one way or another, and regulatory
processes should be open about the way in which such tradeoffs are
conducted. Nevertheless, it is often useful to streamline regulatory
procedures by relying on rules of thumb, and it may make sense
sometimes to proceed on the basis of a zero level of perceived risk.
If such an approach is employed, we should recognize that the risk-
benefit assessment is being applied not to a particular substance
but to alternative regulatory approaches themselves. When evalu-
ating procedures rather than substances, it is important to subject
them to reevaluation as circumstances change, for example, as sci-
entific capability to perceive positive risks improves, as the regula-
tory process itself evolves, as the mix of substances to be regulated
changes, or as the values of society transform. 9
How should risk be discussed and quantified? Assessments of
risk must embrace both its probability and its severity. Much sci-
entific attention has been directed to the problem of measuring the
probability of an adverse effect. Although no less important, evalu-
ating the severity of an adverse effect has received considerably
less attention. Any discussion of a food safety risk should start by
38. See supra note 1.
39. Concern about reorienting the food safety regulatory process is a response to some
such changes. Scientific capabilities have improved dramatically; low-level risks are much
more readily perceived. The overall view of regulation within society is much more skeptical.
In particular, it is recognized increasingly that not all risks can be eliminated from society,
nor should they be.
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identifying the nature of the unfortunate consequence that may re-
sult.40 How serious will be the impairment of function; when will it
occur; how many years will it persist? No cardiovascular problem is
welcome, but one that will appear at age seventy-five is less dread-
ful than one likely to become evident at age forty.
Before beginning the actual quantifying process, a significant
question must be resolved: What level of resources should be de-
voted to the process? Finer and finer calibrations of risk levels al-
ways will be possible for additional expenditures of resources.
However, if a relatively inexpensive, possibly cruder test indicates
that a substance is likely to prove unacceptable, it may be worth-
while to truncate the information-gathering process. The regula-
tory process also may wish to establish standards of minimum ben-
efit and maximum risk that products must meet to win ultimate
approval. These benchmarks could provide an early indication that
a substance is not likely to prove acceptable. 4' Equally important,
a pattern of consistent decisions that follow consistent criteria
should enable companies or interest groups to make informed
judgments about the acceptability of their proposed products. If a
substantial proportion of substances that would not receive ulti-
mate approval are stopped voluntarily before they reach the for-
mal, governmental portion of the regulatory process, the system is
working effectively.
In our discussion we will employ concrete terms for measuring
the probability of a health risk and the severity of that risk. The
probability concept, an RU or risk unit, was created to reflect the
probabilistic manner in which risks are incurred. Most health risks
that society incurs are low-probability risks spread over a wide
population.42 In order to measure the severity of a risk; we will
employ the term QALY, quality-adjusted life year. For example,
instantaneous death to a forty-year-old who would otherwise live a
normal lifetime of seventy-five years would represent the loss of
roughly thirty-five QALYs.
40. For example, a food ingredient with a .001 probability of causing a minor rash is
surely more acceptable than one yielding equivalent benefits but accompanied by a .00001
chance of liver failure.
41. A "revisit process" might be employed to enable substances that exceed the maxi-
mum risk level to seek approval if they also offer a very substantial level of benefits.
42. A situation in which 1,000,000 people face a 1 in 10,000 chance of incurring a dis-
ease is far different from one in which 100 identified people out of a population of 1,000,000
will, with certainty, contract the disease.
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1. Quality-Adjusted Life Years-A Measure of Severity
Ideally, in order to measure the severity of a risk we would
have some readily available measure of health impairment. One
possibility, not likely to gain acceptance whatever its theoretical
validity, would be to develop a monetary scale for health loss. We
suggest an alternative approach that compares health losses di-
rectly with each other. One concept that has been employed exper-
imentally in this regard is loss of quality-adjusted life years. Al-
though we do not expect this concept to be employed directly in
any regulatory decision, we do feel that attention to the differential
consequences of various types of health losses is important. Any
regulatory mechanism, therefore, should explicitly identify the na-
ture of any potential health loss.
The QALY concept has been specifically developed to deal
with situations of uncertainty. QALYs are calculated on an ex-
pected-value basis using a well-accepted technique in decision
analysis called von Neumann-Morgenstern utility. Thus, for exam-
ple, in choosing between one course of action that yields a QALY
level of .9 and another that offers a QALY level of 1 with
probability .85 and a QALY level of .5 with probability .15, the
individual would choose the second course of action. It offers an
expected QALY level of (.85 x 1) + (.15 x .5) = .925, and is there-
fore preferred to the alternative, which offers an expected QALY
level of .9.
Risks must be identified in terms of both severity and
probability, and within the severity category an effort must be
made to distinguish further such aggregate categories as "causes
tumor." If regulations can be formulated that disaggregate by
these two elements, the evolution of regulatory processes through
the actions of companies, individuals, courts, and regulatory agen-
cies will slowly lead to better-informed decisions and, therefore,
better decisions. It would be unrealistic to attempt to describe now
a methodological approach that could be employed successfully.
The outline of the QALY methodology was meant to be merely
suggestive.
Some may object that the QALY approach pays excessive at-
tention to quantification. The counterargument is that by not
quantifying one may gloss over distinctions that are important in
practice, and the difficult process of thinking about numerical val-
ues will engage us in an appropriate thought process. Even if the
objection to the QALY approach were accepted, it would still be
imperative for society to make some attempt to assess the severity
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of the identified risks. At the very least, the consequences of the
risks should be described in words. The object is not to lose sight
of attributes that are not easily quantified.
2. Risk Units-A Measure of Probability
We have stressed throughout this Article the need to focus at-
tention on food risks as they would be incurred and perceived by
well-informed consumers. At the outset of this section on risk, we
distinguished between severity-the magnitude of the loss should
the risky event occur-and probability-the likelihood that the
event will occur. We have proposed the use of some concept analo-
gous to QALYs, which measures loss by the preferences of the con-
sumer, who naturally would be concerned with the timing and
magnitude of his potential loss.
Let us now turn to the probability factor. Fortunately, most
high-risk food items have been eliminated from the food supply,
and so very few of the remaining risks to health or life associated
with food safety are high-probability events. Though commenta-
tors sometimes refer to X cases of cancer or Y additional incidents
of liver malfunction, there are not X individuals who knowingly
will contract cancer because they consume some specific food sub-
stance. We believe that the conversion of small risks to a large
population into a certainty number is fundamentally misleading. It
is quite appropriate for an individual knowingly to take a 1 in
1,000,000 risk of cancer in return for some finite, indeed small,
benefit, yet be quite unwilling to accept the certainty of cancer in
return for any given amount of money or other benefit.43 Given
that individuals confront risks as low-probability events, and given
that there may be nonproportional responses in terms of the
amount of money or other goods required to compensate for risks,
we think it appropriate to discuss risks according to the probabili-
ties with which they are incurred. This more exacting procedure,
unfortunately, tends to bring us into unfamiliar terrain, requiring
us to consider such figures as probabilities of 10 - 1 or 10 - 1.
To measure risk probability we have developed the concept of
a risk unit, or RU (pronounced "Roo"). A RU is a probability of
loss of 10 -3, or 1 in, 1000. The severity unit might be a QALY, a
number of QALYs, or a dollar amount. In the discussion that fol-
lows, assume that a single QALY is at risk. For example, we might




be thinking of alternative risks to the life of a forty-year-old man.
Assume that the decision maker had a variety of ways of avoiding
RUs, that is, of reducing his risk of losing a QALY. He could
purchase safety devices for his automobile, fireproof his house, or
give up rich desserts. Assume that auto safety devices would offer
reductions in RUs for ten dollars each, and that fireproofing would
provide a reduction of one RU at a cost of twelve dollars. Clearly
our protagonist should purchase the auto safety devices before the
fireproofing. Similarly, we could calibrate the value of the rich des-
serts in terms of money-how much he would be willing to pay not
to have to give them up-and see whether that was the most eco-
nomical way to purchase reductions in RUs. Purchasing reductions
in RUs in the cheapest available manner provides both lower risk
(fewer RUs) and more other benefits.
In practice, matters will not be so simple. Rarely will one tech-
nology always provide the cheapest way to purchase reductions in
RUs. In general we must expect to experience diminishing returns.
For example, a person who equips his car for safety may start by
getting new tires to replace his bald ones. Assume that this trans-
action would reduce his risk by ten RUs for one hundred dollars,
or ten dollars per RU. Next he may put in airbags, which reduce
his risk by twenty RUs for three hundred dollars or fifteen dollars
apiece for a total reduction of twenty RUs. Finally, he may
purchase extra heavy bumpers, which reduce his risk by two RUs
at a cost of forty dollars each. Obviously before purchasing airbags
or bumpers he should purchase some of the reductions in RUs
available in home fireproofing for twelve dollars each. 4 The princi-
ple of effective purchase ensures that reductions in RUs could not
be purchased in some other area at less cost than in the areas
where they currently are being purchased. This principle, in es-
sence, is the principle of cost-effectiveness analysis.
Cost-benefit analysis takes matters one step further. Not only
should you expend your resources in a manner that secures maxi-
mum benefit for the level spent, but you should be guided by your
preferences in deciding how much to spend. Consider the purchase
of electricity. Assume that as more electricity gets produced it be-
comes increasingly costly to produce. If the value of a unit of elec-
tricity is nine dollars-that is, if you would give up just nine dol-
44. Diminishing returns must be expected here as well. Eliminating clearly faulty wir-
ing may provide RU reductions cheaply. Assuring that the structure will not burn even if
the temperature gets to 5000, however, may reduce risk only at exceptionally high cost.
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lars' worth of other goods to get the benefits that electricity would
produce-then you should continue to purchase electricity until
the price rises to this level. Another factor may come into play
here. As more electricity is purchased, its value in use may dimin-
ish. At first the electricity may provide light to see other individu-
als or perhaps power to turn on the television set, a significant
source of entertainment. However, more marginal uses, such as for
a trash masher, may yield smaller benefits. The efficient outcome
pays attention both to declining benefits as production goes up and
to increasing costs. The efficient equilibrium is reached when the
cost of producing an additional unit just equals the value of the
benefits it will provide.
Applying the same principles to situations with risks to life
reveals some parallels and some differences. The most dramatic
difference is that we are not comfortable with talking in terms of
valuing concepts such as RUs. In many contexts it will seem down-
right unpleasant; some would say unethical. We continue to make
efforts toward some valuing concept because we know we will sacri-
fice some welfare if we do not. The second difference actually sim-
plifies matters. Over the relevant range for consideration, the value
of an additional reduction of a RU may not change very much.
This suggests that the slope of the demand for reductions in RUs
is not great. The supply curve, however, may be rather steep. As-
sume that the present risk level is .01-one chance in 100 of losing
a QALY. It might be possible to cut this risk to .009-reduce the
RU level from 10 to 9-for an expenditure of $1,000. A further
reduction of the same amount, to .008, may cost $5,000. 45 Addi-
tional reductions in RUs dramatically increase in price. Such a
steep supply curve has two important implications. First, the sup-
ply of reductions in RUs will be the principal determinant of the
number that is purchased. Second, the valuation placed on a re-
duction of a RU-the value that normally would be read off the
demand curve-will not make much difference for the number of
RUs that will be demanded.
Let us see how this discussion would apply to the area of food
safety. First, once we had decided how stringently we wished to
regulate the food supply, we certainly should employ cost-effective-
ness analysis. If reduction in risk is our measure of effectiveness,
45. The demand curve might be downward sloping if an individual had to pay a sub-
stantial portion of his income to purchase reductions in RUs. We do not think that in gen-
eral such a price will be required.
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this analysis is equivalent to risk-benefit analysis. Risk-benefit pro-
cedures should be followed so that we do not sacrifice both reduced
RU reductions and resources. Second, we should attempt to infer
the level of risk that individuals would be willing to incur for a
particular level of foregone benefits. Great precision may not be
essential in this assessment. Third, if decisions are being made
within a political arena, as they certainly will be in the food safety
area, then providing the decision makers with relevant information
about risks and benefits and letting them make the value judg-
ments is the only intellectually defensible process. We do not re-
quire that a full cost-benefit analysis be undertaken, for we know
that the types of decisions that will be made ultimately will rely on
the valuations of these decision makers, not of analysts. Last, any
gross inefficiencies in the process will come not from overvaluing or
undervaluing reductions in RUs, but rather from purchasing ex-
pensive reductions in RUs before reductions that are less costly.
46
This analysis leads to a recommendation for a strategy of full in-
formation, in which decisions are made in light of the best possible
estimates of all consequences. The important objective is to avoid
the major errors.
Consider the use of an additive or different additives in three
different applications. Standardize the quantities for these applica-
tions so that each entails a one RU risk of losing a QALY. The
nonhealth benefits of application A are ten dollars; for application
B one hundred dollars; for application C one dollar per RU of
QALY loss. Any rational process of decision would allow applica-
tion B ahead of application A, which in turn would be ahead of C.
We might well "purchase" the reductions in RUs that would be
available by keeping A and C off the market while allowing B. In
what follows, unless otherwise indicated, the severity unit to which
an RU applies is one QALY.
B. A Conceptual Approach to Decision Making
An intellectually defensible regulatory approach may not fol-
low the dictates of cost-benefit or risk-benefit analysis slavishly.
Any approach, however, should follow such analysis in spirit, em-
ploying ad hoc procedures and rules of thumb when they greatly
simplify choice decisions. The committee on which I served with
Samuel Stumpf, which was charged with proposing a design for a
46. This could occur, for example, if different criteria are used for old and new sub-
stances, for additives and natural contaminants.
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food safety regulatory process, advocated principles in that spirit.
1. When regulatory actions can be taken to eliminate a major risk, take that
action, unless the benefits lost by taking that action are excessive.
2. When no major risk is entailed, conduct an analysis that identifies both
benefits and risks, the latter quantified through the combined RU and QALY
approaches. Take appropriate regulatory decisions when the ratio of indexed
risk to benefits is clearly high (opt for safety) or clearly low (opt for benefits).
3. For whatever regulatory decision is taken, refine the strategy in any man-
ner that can reduce RUs or enhance benefits cheaply. This refinement might











A simple diagram clarifies the recommended procedure. The
line KK in Figure 3 depicts the risk level above which a substance
automatically is banned.4 s Substances that cluster well above some
benchmark line are eliminated. Substances that cluster well below
the benchmark line will be approved. A very large percentage of
47. In theory one should undertake marginal adjustments until the cost per reduction
in RU purchased just comes into line with the marginal value of a reduced RU, which in
turn would be given by the slope of the benchmark line. We argued in the text that the
value of a reduced RU probably would not vary significantly with the quantity purchased.
To the extent it does vary, it will be from income effects. See 1982 FOOD SAFYry COUNCIL
REPORT, supra note 3.




substances probably will fall in these rather distinct regions. For
each accepted substance and the substances that cluster reasona-
bly close to the benchmark line we examine regulatory refinements
that can purchase reductions in RUs at a low price in benefits, or
benefits at a low price in RUs.49
In the example diagrammed in Figure 3, any substance that
entails a risk of more than four RUs for a consumer will be banned
automatically, as is point Z. Point X is ruled out by the benchmark
line, which suggests that a reduction of one RU should be valued
roughly at ten dollars. The substances represented by points U, V,
and W are accepted. Note that V would be transformed to V' in an
optimal scheme, and W to W'. V' accepts additional risk to secure
additional benefits; W' reduces risk at a sacrifice in benefits. Al-
though the movement from U to U' would improve the risk/benefit
ratio, it would be rejected because the reduction in RUs per dollar
of benefits sacrificed does not equal or exceed the rate that the
consumer would accept. Moreover, there are cheaper xeductions in
RUs available elsewhere.5 What about point Y? We have argued
that there will be few such points. Assuming that the initial bench-
mark was drawn with some attention to consumer preferences, it
really does not matter very much what is done with Y.
Cost-benefit analysis traditionally is justified as an efficiency-
seeking measure. Properly performed, it assures that benefits are
maximized for whatever level of expenditure is undertaken. In-
deed, this goal can be reached simply through cost-effectiveness
analysis, of which risk-benefit analysis is a special case.
The second accomplishment of cost-benefit analysis is that it
determines an appropriate level of expenditure for any particular
type of benefit-providing program. When lives are at risk, the na-
ture of the tradeoffs will not vary dramatically with the level of
reduced RUs purchased. Moreover, the world is unlikely to gener-
ate a distribution of RUs that huddles about any benchmark line.
Rule-of-thumb techniques are likely to serve well as a mechanism
for decision making in such a world.
49. Note that we are looking at movements from a particular position. It would not be
appropriate to judge a refinement, therefore, by what it does to the RU/benefit ratio.
50. In general, if there are diminishing marginal benefits and costs, the curves will be




C. Risks to Special Groups
Given the array of potential policy objectives for regulating
food safety, a relevant question is whether adopted regulations
should be applied uniformly across the population or whether they
should be varied according to the market to which a product is
aimed."' If the objective is either to eliminate or to minimize risk,
the proper strategy would seem to be uniform regulation. If the
objectives are less extreme, however, this question becomes very
relevant.
5 2
There are several reasons why one might want different forms
of regulation for different segments of the population. First, differ-
ent societal groups might have different preferences, for example,
in the tradeoff between risk and sacrificed resources. Second, dif-
ferent societal groups might have different potential medical reac-
tions to particular substances. Third, different societal groups
might have different abilities to make informed choices. Last, dif-
ferent societal groups may experience different levels of
externalities.
One approach to this question of the proper scope of regula-
tion is to examine how society deals with similar concerns in other
regulatory areas and to look at possible methods that could be
used in dealing with food additives. For instance, many products
contain toxic chemicals that are intended for external use but are
harmful if taken internally. The regulatory strategy here has been
to label these products with warnings of risk but not to limit their
sale. Thus, regulators have decided not to eliminate risk, but
rather to inform consumers of the risk and to tolerate the risk of
tragedy associated with the chance that an unattended infant
might ingest the product. Similarly, a decision has been made to
51. A further relevant question in this context is whether it is reasonable to assume
that consumption of a product can be limited to that segment of the market to which it is
aimed.
5%9.. This auestion can be incorporated into a decision tree, as depicted in Figure 4.
Figure 4
set upper bound on risk
566 [Vol. 38:539
FOOD SAFETY DECISIONS
tolerate some risk in over-the-counter drugs. A number of sub-
stances, such as aspirin, are made readily accessible to consumers
in potentially lethal quantities.
A third, more complicated situation is prescription drugs.
Physicians have been given the responsibility of regulating the dis-
tribution of these commodities and of knowing their "tolerable"
levels of consumption. Doctors must be especially aware of the dif-
ferential effects of certain substances on various subgroups like fe-
tuses, infants, the elderly, and women of childbearing age. Doctors
also are expected to know the interactive effects, both synergistic
and antagonistic, associated with giving certain drugs in combina-
tion and to advise patients of possible adverse effects of ingesting
certain substances while taking particular drugs. The doctor pre-
sumably chooses to incorporate his knowledge of differential ef-
fects of drugs into his strategy of distribution, rather than choosing
to deny drugs inflexibly to all groups because they are potentially
toxic to some groups. Examples of this strategy abound in
medicine. Eating food containing a high content of tyramine, such
as cheese, is dangerous to a patient being treated for depression
with a MAO inhibitor but not for a patient being treated with a
tricyclic antidepressant drug. A physician should warn his patient
accordingly. A second, broader example is the many drugs that
have adverse side effects only when administered to a mother in
the perinatal period. In this situation, doctors typically refrain
from giving these drugs to women in the perinatal period whenever
possible, but continue to prescribe the drugs to others.5
In many situations, then, society has opted to tolerate some
health risks and to apply standards differentially to various popu-
lation subgroups. What should be done in the case of food addi-
tives? A number of factors dealt with in other sections of this Arti-
cle are relevant to this question. The concerns of this section, as
they bear on this question, can be summarized as follows:
(1) Objectives should be outlined with regard to attitudes toward risk.
(2) If appropriate methodology can be devised, the objective of limiting risk
53. The complexity of the differential effects may lead doctors to concentrate their
attention on a single specialty such as pediatrics or cardiology. Such specialization enables
doctors to master the information necessary for dealing effectively with their patients.
Issues of this sort have arisen in the occupational safety and health area. Some risks are
incurred primarily in particular groups. An example that has received widespread discussion
concerns pregnant women working in plants that make batteries. Critical lawsuits have been
fought to determine whether exposures at all jobs in such plants must be set so that the




is preferable to eliminating or ignoring risk. Eliminating risk seems infeasible,
and ignoring risk may lead to significant health loss without commensurate
gains in benefits.
(3) If appropriate methodology can be devised at reasonable cost, nonuniform
regulation is preferable to uniform regulation."
(4) Whatever strategy is adopted, the methodology should be flexible enough
to adapt to changes in the available knowledge about the risks of consump-
tion of various materials.
(5) Whatever system is adopted and however individualized it might be, we
should recognize that when groups differ either on preferences or on risk
levels, there will be inevitable tradeoffs between the well-being of different
groups. 55 The purpose of a nonuniform strategy is to limit the magnitude of
the problem caused by conflicting interests, to allow one group to benefit
from a product at the same time that another group can readily limit its use
of the product.
D. Use of Information on Risk
Much of the debate within the food safety area starts with the
observation that our quantitative assessments of benefits and risks
cannot be precise. Rather than throw our hands in the air at this
point or stay with the status quo, however, it is worthwhile to in-
quire what we would have done or should do with complete infor-
mation. This Article argues that we should use that information to
design a regulatory system that will approximate the choice that
well-informed individuals would make for themselves. This does
not imply, for instance, that we should ban substances that are un-
acceptable to the median consumer. To do so would deny the right
to use the substances to those consumers who would be willing to
accept higher risks relative to benefits or to those consumers who
are at lower than average risk. Neither does it imply that we
should rely solely on an informational strategy. This approach
would impose severe decision-making costs on consumers, and they
undoubtedly would make some errors as well. The ideal system un-
doubtedly will employ a mix of strategies-doing nothing, limiting
54. While there are many similarities between the food additive situation and the pre-
scription drug situation, there are many differences as well. The costs of individualizing
distribution are much lower in the prescription drug situation, in which the doctor must
consider each case individually whether drugs are concerned or not.
An alternative and less complicated strategy could be to label products with obvious
symbols, such as a red dot, or a syringe, or a baby, as an indication that known or unknown
health risks might be associated with consumption of the product by particular
groups-each group being clearly specified.
55. To provide the highest level of protection to group A-individuals who are vio-
lently allergic to a particular yellow food dye-it may be necessary to limit the opportunity
of group B to consume the substance. In the example cited, given the potential failures of a
labeling system, we may not want to allow the product on the market at all.
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use, providing information, and banning.
The design of a regulatory system is essentially an exercise in
decision making under uncertainty. No system can expect to
reproduce exactly the choices that well-informed consumers them-
selves would have made. The objective should be to define the sys-
tem that performs best on the average. In designing such a system,
we must also be alert to the divergence between the actual per-
formance of systems and the way they would perform under ideal
circumstances. The present regulatory system, responding as we
would expect to a host of political pressures, to some extent re-
flects a risk-benefit orientation. Its operation, however, is ex-
tremely haphazard.56 A somewhat rationalized system could offer
both more benefits and less risk to consumers.
E. Uncertainty in Probability Assessments and Updating
Estimates
Whatever regulatory system we design must recognize that
measures of risk are likely to be imprecise. The theory of decision
making under uncertainty has dealt with this problem in a number
of arenas in addition to food safety. Two important lessons have
emerged.
First, the appropriate measure for an uncertain probability is
the mean of the distribution of that probability. Assume that we
have a substance that has one chance in ten of conveying a ten-RU
risk of losing a QALY and nine chances in ten of conveying a one-
RU risk of losing a QALY. The mean risk is then 1.9 RUs. Con-
sider an individual who must choose between consuming this sub-
stance or another that incurs a certain two-RU risk. The individual
should choose the first substance even though the true value of the
probability is an uncertain parameter itself. This principle-the
resolution of lotteries on probabilities into their expected val-
ues-is the cornerstone of von Neumann-Morgenstern utility the-
56. A cynical view would suggest that the greater the total economic losses to the af-
fected industry, the less likely it is that a product would be severely limited in use or re-
moved from the market. One might argue that this would be rational if consumers' and
producers' benefits were roughly proportional, but they are not. The appropriate measure is
risk per unit of benefit. The system described would make limitation less likely the greater
the total risk. Other factors being equal, the greater the consumption of a product, the less
likely it is to be banned.
There are strong forces operating on the risk side of the equation as well. They too do
not always push for rationality. In the present state of affairs, it seems much simpler for
those who highlight the risk side of the equation to keep products off the market than to
reduce the use of those already in widespread use.
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ory, which itself serves as the basis for the contemporary theory of
rational decision making under uncertainty..
7
Second, when there is uncertainty on a probability there may
be attractive opportunities for sequential strategies for learning
and action. Opportunities for learning should push the regulatory
system in two directions. First, it should be more flexible. If learn-
ing is to be useful, the system must be able to change the way a
substance is regulated or the strictness with which it is regulated.
For example, an informational approach should be able to evolve
into a use-limitation approach and vice versa. Second, the system
should be less restrictive in permitting the initial use of sub-
stances, on the assumption that experience will generate useful in-
formation. When there is uncertainty, there is the possibility that
the product will have a better than expected risk-benefit ratio. In
this case, its use can be continued or expanded, thereby yielding
significant net benefits that offset the expected losses from setting
a lower standard at the outset.
If a substance has an acceptable risk-benefit ratio but further
testing would produce more information, it may seem appropriate
to ban the substance and wait to see if the new information
reduces the expected value of the ratio. On an expected-value ba-
sis, however, that approach would produce a loss in welfare along
the way. Because further study might push the risk-benefit ratio
into the unacceptable range, the only analytic argument in favor of
banning a substance with an acceptable ratio is that such a ban
may be necessary to ensure that the additional information is gen-
erated. Ideally, the regulatory system will be sufficiently flexible to
allow conditional approval, which will be removed if additional
study is not undertaken in some specified time period or if the ad-
ditional study provides unfavorable information.
In short, the regulatory system should treat substances in a
dynamic context. An initial regulatory decision should be recog-
nized as such. Further information should be gathered so that a
more refined decision can be made later. Indeed, the design of the
regulatory system should encourage or require the collection of
such information.
V. COMMON ERRORS IN RISK-BENEFIT ASSESSMENT
This analysis rests on the assumption that regulatory efforts
should provide individuals with the commodities they would select
57. See H. RAIwFA, DECISION ANALYSIS (1968).
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for themselves were they well informed and purchasing in well-
functioning markets. In addition, proper regulation has an objec-
tive function that requires balancing the risks to health with other
valued attributes such as nutrition, convenience, economy, and ap-
peal of food products. Fully informed individuals would be ex-
pected to select a diet consistent with maximization of their wel-
fare on such an objective function. Many common approaches to
risk-benefit analysis address the tradeoff between these sets of at-
tributes, yet fall into logical errors. Here we catalogue a few of
those errors that are most commonly observed.
A. Taking Excessive Guidance from Risk Levels in Other
Areas
Many analyses of risk suggest that a problem is of secondary
importance in some sense because other risks are much greater.
Whether we should or should not accept a substance into our food
supply is independent of the risks entailed in crossing the street or
getting hit by lightning. In the category of food, the argument
sometimes is made that, because contamination causes more illness
and death than food-induced carcinogenesis, we should be more
concerned about eliminating contamination. The inference does
not hold. Only if we could show that the same reduction in illness
and death could be achieved in the contamination area at a smaller
sacrifice in benefits than in the carcinogenesis area would we be
correct in pushing for tighter regulation in the first area as op-
posed to the second. The central principle of effective regulation is
that the marginal cost of achieving some given amount of risk re-
duction should be constant across areas.
B. Failing to Take Appropriate Guidance From Risk Levels in
Other Areas
One type of information can be secured from examination of
risk levels in other areas. To the extent that those risks are volun-
tarily accepted and understood, they may indicate the shape of in-
dividuals' objective functions. If a worker knowingly will take a one
in 10,000 risk of cancer to earn an extra $200 per year, we get a
very rough indication of how he feels about the risk of cancer. Sup-
pose such risk premiums were widely deserved in the labor market.
Moreover, assume that a food additive was under consideration
that would save an individual $100 a year in food costs, but would
entail a risk of cancer estimated to be one in 100,000. This occupa-
tional risk information would suggest that the food additive risk
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level was not excessive. If, however, the food risk turned out to be
one in 1,000, the occupational evidence would suggest that the risk
should not be taken. Obviously there is a range of in-between val-
ues for which the occupational risk comparison would provide no
guidance. In those areas, however, in which guidance can be se-
cured-and there are many more than we would expect, given the
capricious nature of both the regulatory process and decisions con-
cerning low-probability events-it should be taken.
C. Recognizing When the Absolute Size of a Problem is
Relevant
The absolute magnitude of a food safety problem is of conse-
quence when we wish to determine what level of research and regu-
latory resources should be devoted to its examination and control.
Assume that there are two substances on the market, whose bene-
fits and risks per unit under present regulatory strictures are esti-
mated to be the same. Over 100 million units of substance A but
only 1 million units of substance B are ingested each year in the
United States. This "incidence" information alone would not sug-
gest that strictures on substance A should be any different from
those on substance B. It would imply, however, that resources
available to find out more about the risks of the two substances
would be addressed more profitably to substance A.58 If the infor-
mation suggested any change in regulation, a much greater quan-
tity of resources would be at issue with substance A. Therefore,
though the expected information gained about the two substances
might be equal, the expected value of that information would be
greater for substance A.
What would happen if, after the research were undertaken,
the estimated risk and benefit levels for substance A were not no-
ticeably changed? This would suggest that present regulations
should not be changed either. Regulation should be based on the
best available estimates of marginal benefits and risks. Just be-
cause the estimates are based on firmer information does not imply
that regulation should be tighter or looser.
58. This conclusion assumes that the likely scientific returns on research are no
greater for one substance than the other. In the language of decision analysis the value of
the information gained from a laboratory-month would be equal for the two substances.
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D. Failing to Make Benefits Part of the Calculation
The most common error is to ignore benefits when choosing
regulated levels of risk. Ignoring benefits would be appropriate
only if some rather extreme assumptions were valid: (1) Society
legitimately thought that safety and health were its only concerns
and, therefore, only a zero level of risk was permissible; and (2)
Artificially induced risks associated with food safety affected wel-
fare completely differently from risks inherent in the food products
themselves. If the second assumption is not satisfied, a zero risk
level for man-made additives would make no sense, because we are
already running nonnegligible risks elsewhere. If the first assump-
tion is not satisfied-some nonzero risk level is deemed accept-
able-then it would have to be a risk level per some unit. Some of
the units that are at times invoked do not make sense unless they
are proportional to the benefits at issue. The unit that comes clos-
est to accurately reflecting benefits is probably per adult serving,
for if there were equal benefits from a serving of anything, we
would have a reasonable surrogate for benefits. However, the bene-
fits one gets from a serving will depend first on how much one val-
ues the particular commodity in question, and second on what the
alternative is. If the alternative is much less healthful, much less
tasty, or much more expensive, the benefits of the particular com-
modity are high.
The appropriate decision criterion is, as stressed repeatedly, to
do as consumers would do for themselves. Consumers naturally
look to benefits in deciding whether to accept a particular increase
in risks. For example, on an icy morning, many people would drive
to get to work, but not just to go downtown to pick up a candy bar.
We eat candy bars, which may be bad for us, because we get enjoy-
ment from them. Other equally harmful substances are not in-
gested because they give less pleasure. This example does not sug-
gest that individuals are finely honed balancing machines that
delicately calibrate costs and benefits and make quantitative deci-
sions. Individuals are roughly guided by costs and benefits, how-
ever, and they attempt to direct their diets accordingly. When cho-
lesterol became associated in the public consciousness with high
risk levels, egg consumption went down. Benefits did not change,
but individuals believed that risk levels were higher. Similarly, if
some process were discovered to make liver more tasty, we could
expect the consumption of this perceived healthful product to in-
crease. From the standpoint of the regulatory process it is not im-
portant whether consumers make mistakes or act on the basis of
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poor information. The critical objective still should be to help con-
sumers do what they would like to do for themselves.
E. Giving Inadequate Consideration to the Shapes of Benefit
and Risk Curves
At various junctures in this Article, we have highlighted the
difficulties of making accurate assessments of benefits and the
much more extreme problems of attempting to assess risks. At the
same time, we have suggested that an orderly inquiry to determine
these magnitudes as best as possible would be desirable. Even deci-
sions based on highly imperfect information are superior to those
made in a vacuum.
One useful piece of information is the shape of benefit and
risk curves. This information would be important when considering
whether a ban of a substance is desirable as opposed to some limi-
tation on its use. Though there is widespread disagreement on the
form as well as the location of dose-response curves, over the range
of likely human consumption, reduction in risk from reduction in
dose probably will be fairly constant. 9
Assuming a roughly linear response, it does not make sense to
limit, as opposed to ban, human consumption because of reduction
in risk alone. If it is worthwhile to reduce one unit, it would be
worthwhile to reduce the next, unless another factor were at play.
The other critical factor is benefits. Even if risks are roughly linear
over the range of consideration, the level of benefits foregone as
intake is reduced may increase significantly. For example, cutting
consumption from four units to three units may cut benefits by
fifteen, and moving from three to two may reduce benefits by
twenty-five. If the benefit curve has steep upward slope, and there
is both empirical and theoretical evidence suggesting that it will in
some instances, then there is an argument for limiting rather than
banning use. We wish to limit use to the more essential areas in
which benefits are high-areas in which consumers would be will-
ing to accept the risks because the benefits foregone to reduce
them would be even larger.
Consider two possible problem areas: aflatoxins in peanuts and
artificial sweeteners. Assume for purposes of argument that the
per-unit risks over the relevant range are constant. As we reduce
the permissible levels of aflatoxin, thereby increasing the propor-
59. Thus, even if the dose-response curve has an S shape, it is likely that we will be
operating primarily on one of the flatter ranges.
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tion of the peanut crop that would have to be destroyed, the level
of economic dislocation would rise at an increasing rate. Because
price would be rising, the value of what was destroyed would rise
faster. Therefore, it might be reasonable to have, as we now do, a
permissible level for aflatoxins in peanuts, recognizing that we are
still running a risk. The marginal benefits of artificial sweeteners
are harder to identify. However, a simulated experiment can lend
some insight. Assume we were to levy a tax on the sweeteners. As
the tax grew larger, the uses of the sweetener would grow more
restrictive. At least in broad strokes, this is an indication of the
increasing marginal cost, as perceived by consumers, of limiting in-
take of the sweeteners. Even with a severe tax some uses would
persist. This persistence suggests that for those uses, even after
taking account of the health risks, the perceived benefits of the
sweeteners are exceedingly high.
This argument is as cogent for new additives as for those ex-
isting on the market. However, once uses have become established
it is much harder politically to prohibit them. This reluctance to
ban previously accepted substances undoubtedly explains the vio-
lent reaction against a possible saccharin ban. If the FDA had
sought merely to reduce the use of saccharin by taxing it, limiting
its production, or banning its use in more marginal products, the
outcry probably would have been far less severe. With new addi-
tives, the individuals who would benefit from the high-valued uses
may be unaware of their potential benefits. There is not much of a
lobby, for instance, for cheaper meat that would be produced with
the assistance of a risky substance. But if a substance now widely
employed were to be taken off the market, raising meat prices no-
ticeably, there would be a great deal of opposition.
The point of this section is that regulatory policies should give
strong consideration to the shape of benefit curves as well as risk
curves. Because benefit curves may be much less linear, it may be
reasonable to restrict uses of some additives, but not to ban them.
F. Over Distinguishing Between Natural and Man-Induced
Risks
At first glance, it seems reasonable for the regulatory process
to distinguish between aflatoxins-a mold that occurs naturally in
peanuts-and man-induced additives. Nature has burdened us
with the first; we would be burdening ourselves with the latter. To
the extent, however, that we can eliminate natural risks from the
food supply just as easily as we can avoid taking on new ones, the
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distinction diminishes in importance. Obviously, if we rely on esti-
mated benefits and risks, any distinction between natural risks and
man-induced risks vanishes unless we feel differently about those
two classes of risks. Why might we have such feelings? First, our
society feels differently about errors of omission and commission,
treating commission much more harshly. Second, any attempt to
remove risks currently in the food supply might require substantial
dislocation of present resources and alteration of present consump-
tion patterns.60 Failing to have the opportunity to move toward a
"superior" consumption pattern, the sacrifice when a new additive
is banned is hardly as severe. Obviously political forces would be
strongly responsive to this factor: in-place resources are weighed
much more heavily than others.61
What should we conclude about the distinction between natu-
ral and man-induced risks? First, there will be powerful forces and
traditions suggesting that natural risks should be counted less
heavily. Second, in terms of benefits foregone and risks incurred,
there is no distinction between the two. Third, though somewhat
different standards may be warranted in the two areas, gross dif-
ferences are inappropriate. If we can accept fifteen parts per billion
of aflatoxins in corn, we also should be willing to accept some
nonzero carcinogenic risk levels in additives, assuming that the
benefits are commensurate with those of naturally "contaminated"
corn.
G. Drawing the False Implication That High Natural Risk
Reduces the Need for Regulatory Stringency
We discussed above the fallacious nature of the argument that
because risk A, which entails one chance in 10,000 of death, is pre-
sent in society, risk B, which entails merely one chance in 30,000 of
death, also should be accepted. A closely related error is to say
that because some risk due to C is already accepted, indeed per-
haps cannot be eliminated, some additional risk due to C, particu-
larly if it is small relative to the present level of risk, is
acceptable.2
60. There are immediate losses in capital value as well as losses to displaced factors of
production that must seek their highest return during a transitional period.
61. The disparity in the treatment that present policies give to new versus previously
approved substances can be seen as a product of these factors at work.
62. This argument has been made frequently with regard to man-induced radiation.
Some contend that the problem is less serious because of background radiation and inevita-
ble radiation from X-rays.
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For efficiency, as we have argued above, we wish to look at the
benefits foregone for marginal reductions in risk level in each area
in which reductions could be achieved. Assume that there is cur-
rently no risk due to D, but that naturally caused consequences of
risk C are already ten RUs of the loss of one QALY. New foods
containing C and D now come up for review. For a given quantity
of benefits, perhaps calibrated on a dollar scale to equal $200, the
food containing C introduces an additional risk of one RU. For
that same quantity of benefits, the food containing D introduces a
risk of two RUs. If total risk level and total benefits are the objects
of our choice, clearly it would be foolish to approve the food con-
taining D and reject the one containing C. Yet this is frequently
proposed. Sometimes the supporting argument is that we should
have zero risk level except when nature has made a higher level
inevitable. Assuming that this argument is correct, it also would
suggest that man-produced additions to the level of risks initially
produced by nature also should be zero. If no quantity of benefits
is worth any additional risk, it does not matter what the base is,
whether zero or larger.
There is one possible argument for accepting different risk
levels when a sizable natural risk or previously approved risk is
already in place. It is an anxiety argument. Individuals worry
about small-probability events almost independently of the size of
the probability. Most people probably would worry more if they
were told there was one chance in 10,000 of contracting cancer
from ice cream consumption and one chance in 10,000 of con-
tracting cancer from bacon consumption than if they were told
that bacon was safe, but that ice cream consumption entailed a
risk of three in 10,000. If the probabilities are small enough, then
the anxiety cost may be large relative to the cost associated with
the health loss itself.6 3
63. Recognition of the potential importance of anxiety presents a peculiar dilemma for
policy. Normally we think that individuals are better off when they are given information
about the products they will consume. If, for example, consumers are told that something is
less safe than they had previously thought, they will be able to reduce their consumption of
that good. This assumes that they can process that information reasonably well at negligible
cost. However, if there is evidence that they worry when they confront two separate risks
whose total risk probabilities are lower than an alternative single risk, they are not process-
ing in the manner that decision analysis would prescribe. Indeed, it could be argued that the
information should not be provided, and the only options would be to ban, limit, or permit
the substance.
Consider a slightly different example that makes the same point. Assume that there is a
risk that is difficult to avoid but generally unrecognized, such as the risk of being hit by a
meteor. It probably would not do the world much good to publicize the existence of that
1985]
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
If the dose-response curve is nonlinear,6 4 there would be an-
other reason to distinguish between additions to underlying risk
and new risks. Without such attention we might miscompute the
increments to risk. Assume, for example, that the dose-response
curve has the logistic shape, so that the increment to risk for an
additional dose at low levels is substantially smaller than the incre-
ment to risk for large doses. Two equally carcinogenic substances
are under comparison; one is already prevalent in the environment.
If equal additional doses of the two substances are under consider-
ation, someone naively might decide that the increments to risk
are the same, but they are not. The substance that is already prev-
alent would produce a much greater increment to risk because of
the nonlinear relationship between dosage and risk. This relation-
ship suggests that, other things equal, ruling out anxiety, and pos-
iting a dose-response curve that is bowed toward the horizontal
axis, we should be more willing to accept an additional dose of sub-
stances that are not currently prevalent.6 5
H. Failing to Recognize That the Mean of a Distribution on a
Probability is the Only Appropriate Variable for Basing
Decisions
The food safety literature is replete with statements that the
estimated risk level is X, but further information might reveal it to
be .lX or 1OX. Therefore, we should regulate this substance more
stringently than another one whose estimated risk level is Y, when
Y = X. There are two points to be made about this situation.
First, if X is the best guess, the center of scientific opinion, or
the midpoint of the range of subjective probability estimates, X is
likely to be an inappropriate variable for decision. The appropriate
variable is the mean of this underlying subjective distribution. If
risk. Few people optimally would choose to change their lives by staying indoors, and the
major consequence might be just that people would worry more.
64. At least two of the leading models on food safety suggest that the dose-response
curve is nonlinear.
65. A more sophisticated analysis would look to across-substance complementarities or
interactions in producing risks. It may be that substance A becomes a more powerful carcin-
ogen or mutagen in the presence of substance B. If so, even if the dose-response curves for
each of the substances, holding the quantity of the other substance fixed, have the required
bowed shape, it would be better to concentrate on one substance or the other. Assume, for
example, that over the relevant range the true total risk (with K a constant) is
R = K(1 + A2)(1 + B2).
The dose-response curves over a total lifespan for either substance shows increasing bodily
damage. The choice is to find a total dosage of A plus B equal to 10. The optimal division
would be 9.9 of A and .1 of B or vice versa.
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the true value is distributed symmetrically about X, then the me-
dian and the mean will coincide. If, however, it turns out that the
true value is as likely to be twice as big as X as it is to be half as
big as X, then the mean will be substantially greater than the me-
dian. Yet we may find it simpler to think about medians of such
asymmetric distributions. This is perfectly acceptable; we just have
to learn how to translate from medians to means. One commonly
employed distribution is the lognormal. It assumes that the log of a
variable is distributed normally, which implies that a value twice
as high as the best guess is as likely as one half as high as the best
guess. This assumption may be appropriate when dealing with
small probabilities on a subjective basis. If a variable is distributed
lognormally, the relationship between the median or mode and the
mean is described in the footnote.66 This discussion suggests that
regulatory procedures should be more conservative when a highly
uncertain risk estimate has been provided, because we may have
employed an incorrect summary statistic for that estimate, perhaps
the median instead of the mean.
If we truly have an estimate of the mean value of a
probability, then that is the correct number to employ. This is a
central principle of decision analysis: Lotteries on probabilities are
resolved on an expected-value basis. Thus, for example, let us as-
sume that a substance has one chance in ten of being at zero risk
level, eight chances in ten of having a risk of one in 10,000, and one
chance in ten of having a risk of one chance in 1,000. The mean
risk would be 1.8 in 1,000. If no further information could be se-
cured, this substance should be treated identically with another
substance that was known to bear a risk of 1.8 in 1,000.67
The skeptic might argue: This information on variability in
risk levels is all very interesting, but it hardly makes sense to at-
tempt to attach any numbers to food safety risks. Our models of
extrapolation from high doses to low doses are highly inexact, to
say nothing of the problems in extrapolation from consequences on
66.
Lognormal Distribution
Standard Deviation as a Factor of Mean
1 2 5 10 100
Mean as Multiple of 1 1.27 3.65 14.17 40,287
Median and Mode
I would like to thank Donald Shepard for carrying out this calculation. The multiple equals
exp[/ ci].
67. See H. RAnFA, supra note 57.
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animals to consequences for human beings. The answer to this ob-
jection is: What other approach is better? It is irresponsible not to
take advantage of as much information as is available. Although
for some probability estimates the range of error may be signifi-
cant, a body of thought has built up around decision analysis to
deal with hard-to-assess, low-probability events.
Thus, for example, consider two alternative artificial sweeten-
ers that are alike in cost, taste, and so on. Both sweeteners are
subjected to animal tests at high dosages. One leads to tumors in X
out of 10,000 animals, the other to tumors in 2X out of 10,000. On
the basis of this information, it is still possible that the second
substance has less tumor-inducing effect in man than in animals.
But, if we decide it is worthwhile to take the gamble and permit
the marketing of one of the sweeteners, surely it would be prefera-
ble to choose the first substance over the second.
This is but one example of a much more general principle.
Even if we cannot estimate absolute risk levels accurately, we fre-
quently may have information on comparative expected risk levels.
We may not know how risky substance A is, but we may know that
on average it is safer than B. What do we mean by average if only
two substances are under consideration? If 1,000 such pairs of sub-
stances were under consideration and if the less risky was selected
in each pair to make up a less risky group, then with high
probability the total risk associated with the less risky group would
be lower than that of the more risky group.
L Assigning Excessive Credibility to the Choice of
Extrapolative Model
There are at least three widely discussed models for extrapo-
lating risk levels back from high to low dosages. Each model has its
own theoretical underpinnings. Unfortunately, the three models
may produce very different predictions about the risks inherent at
low dosage levels.6 8 It seems unlikely that substantial evidence will
be available soon to enable us to make a solid scientific choice
among these models. We must recognize that any regulatory proce-
dure concerning food safety is a decision taken under conditions of
significant uncertainty. The lack of sufficient scientific evidence
about extrapolative models is one significant factor generating such
uncertainty. One should not take false reassurance or ring false
alarm through the choice of one model over another.
68. See 1982 FOOD SAFETY COUNciL REPORT, supra note 3.
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Perhaps one of the reasons why the debate over models has
gained such prominence is the zero risk level requirement with re-
gard to carcinogenic substances. So long as there is some chance
that the one-hit model is correct, any substance that induces any
malignancies in any concentrations in animals must be ruled out.
There always will be some risk. One part of the problem, of course,
is that the zero risk level is probably inappropriate as a criterion.
It implies that there is no tradeoff with other valued variables.
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article presents one approach to the problem of assessing
risks and benefits. Much of our discussion focused on health risks
and benefits, for we believe that is the less familiar area in which
to employ the prediction and bookkeeping procedures we recom-
mend. The RU and QALY concepts outlined here as a means of
tabulating the probability and severity associated with health risks
represent just one approach. There has been an explosion of pro-
posed procedures for tallying information on health risks. The
most controversial aspect of our recommended procedure will be
the fact that it aggregates risks received by different individuals.
To the extent that it is possible to design the food safety regula-
tory system so that different resources flow to different individuals,
this should create no difficulty. Each category of consumer could
be considered separately. Unfortunately, rarely will such fine-tun-
ing be possible. Securing health benefit A for individual 1 will im-
ply that individual 2 suffers health risk B. Such implicit tradeoffs,
however uncomfortable, are part of any pattern of government or
nongovernment decisions affecting health. Still, they are uncom-
fortable tradeoffs. To some, the RU and QALY approach will have
the virtue of treating all individuals as equals, in effect making
health benefits and risks anonymous quantities. Others may feel,
however, that this very element renders such methods of aggrega-
tion unacceptable. For individuals with this attitude, we recom-
mend that they disaggregate by individuals or groups, but main-
tain a classification system that looks to both probability and
severity.
Risk and benefit considerations already affect regulatory deci-
sions for food, albeit in an unacknowledged and often haphazard
fashion. Risk and benefit assessment should be recognized as a vi-
tal tool and systematically incorporated into the regulatory process
along with considerable safeguards so that its primary purpose-to
reproduce the choices the well-informed consumer would make for
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himself-is not lost. This Article outlines some methodologies that
might be employed and warns of some problems that might be
encountered.
Whatever the difficulties inherent in the use of systematic
tools for guiding food safety decisions, they are likely to be
dwarfed by the irrationalities inherent in a system that pretends
not to recognize certain tradeoffs that are a vital part of its work-
ing. Though a little knowledge may be dangerous, a pretense to
having none is downright reckless.
This Article's analysis has focused on food safety regulation as
it is viewed and might be reformed within our own country. The
problem of food supply, as the tragic famines of recent years dram-
atize, is substantially more monumental for less developed nations.
Many risk-bearing technologies have the capability to expand
world food supply. Incidents such as the Bhopal poison-gas disas-
ter, however, have reinforced the argument that developing nations
should employ the same levels of stringency in risk protection as
the wealthy, developed nations. The tradeoff is stark. As Samuel
Stumpf phrased it, "The use of pesticides, fertilizers, and chemical
additives appears to require a cost in the form of probable hazards
to life, yet these products provide the most support for survival."69
In determining how the world is to feed itself, it seems evident
that we are confronted ultimately with the question of trading
risks for benefits.
69. See Stumpf, The Moral Dimension of the World's Food Supply, 1 ANN. REV. Nu-
TRION 1, 25 (1981).
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